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8 April 1966

WHAT DID IT MEAN TO WIN IN WORLD WAR II?

By


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What did it Mean to Win in World War II?

by

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8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

What did it mean to win in World War II? It is the purpose of this paper to view certain characteristics of seven protagonists of World War II during the postwar decade to determine if therein might be found some insight concerning winning.

China, France, Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (US) are appraised with respect to both national productivity and individual well-being. The statistics used are those pertaining to production of crude steel and electric energy, per capita gross national product, infant mortality, and diffusion of the private automobile.

There appears to be little if any correlation between recovery and progress during the postwar decade and victory or defeat. Victorious China lost practically all its territory and people to the Communists.

Vanquished Germany ceased to exist as a unified Germany. About one-fourth of the area of Germany was taken over by Poland and all Germans evacuated. Another fourth fell behind the USSR curtain and became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The remaining half became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

Vanquished Japan was fortunate enough to have been occupied primarily by the US. Although forced to withdraw back to her home islands, Japan with assistance from the US, recovered from the devastation of war to become the thriving country of the Far East.

Postwar well-being for the individual person depended more on whether or not his country was Communist ruled rather than whether the country was a winner or loser in war.

If there are any criteria for winning, there is one, at least as far as the US is concerned. That one is to silence the guns of war and bring about a cessation of hostilities with enough surviving resourcefulness to be a meaningful and influential presence in the postwar period. Thereafter it is a question of making the most of all promising opportunities.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to present a flash-back view of what it meant to the winner to win in World War II (WW II). For the vanquished, what did it mean to lose, to surrender unconditionally. It is hoped that this moment for reflection will stimulate the consideration of the question frequently asked, "What does it mean to win?" currently with reference to the war in Vietnam. The preceding sentence purposefully says consideration of the question meaning to imply that more than just answers are sought. Perhaps this is not the "guts issue" question that should be answered, the question for which alternative solutions must be sought. What should the question be? This itself suggests an alternate question. What should it mean to win, say in Vietnam? What did it mean to win in WW II? What is the essence of winning?

Having won or lost, what happened to the people who remained? How did they take advantage of postwar opportunities, or how were they exploited? How free and well-off are they as indicated by a review of selected, primarily economic statistics? Are there any messages in the wake of war that should influence the meaning of win?

In order to keep this paper manageable and the view clear, and also recognizing that some limits should be set for so vast a theme, this paper is focused on five of the eighteen Allied powers and two

of the seven Axis powers of WW II and five series of primarily economic statistics. The five Allies selected are the Big Five, the five permanent and "veto" empowered members of the Security Council of the United Nations: (in alphabetical order) China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), United Kingdom (UK), and United States of America (US). The two Axis members selected were the most powerful of the Axis: Germany and Japan. The statistics selected are population and territory, national product on a per capita basis, national production of steel and electric power, prevalence of passenger cars, and infant mortality rates.

To identify the countries for whom statistics are subsequently presented, the countries are described in Chapter 2 in terms of their populations and territories.

In Chapter 3 the countries are described in terms of postwar national productivity and individual well-being. The statistics presented are selected because they seem to convey an almost tangible, if limited, picture of the progress or lack of progress made during the postwar period by the peoples concerned as countries and as individuals.

The first series of data shows the country's production of crude steel over the postwar period. The data is in terms of tons of steel produced and should convey with it pictures of very large industrial enterprises pouring steel which will be subsequently converted into bridges, buildings, automobiles, and the many other

items to be found in a modern industrial nation to include, unfortunately, weapons for war.

The quantity of kilowatt hours of electrical energy produced may not be as readily visualized as a ton of steel, however, when the quantities are large they indicate considerable industrial activity. It probably also indicates at least for some countries that many homes are loaded or overloaded with a proliferation of electricity consuming conveniences.

One method frequently used to describe the economy of a nation is to review its real gross national product. The gross national product (GNP) of a nation is the total value at current market prices of all the goods and services the country produced over a specific period of time, usually a year. When comparing the annual GNP of a nation over a longer period of time it becomes desirable to remove the changes in GNP caused by inflation or deflation. This is done by converting the prevailing annual market prices to the prices prevailing in a specified year. Having removed the influence of changing prices for the same amount of production, the resulting GNP's are identified as real gross national products or GNP at constant prices.

Although the goods and services included in GNP are quite tangible, the totals when transformed into billions and hundreds of billions of dollars begin to lose their feel of reality. An illustrator who shows that a stack of one thousand dollar bills totaling one billion dollars is higher than the 555.5 foot high

Washington Monument reveals little if anything about the value or purchasing power of the billion dollars.¹ The GNP series used for this paper is one which has been converted to index numbers on a per capita basis. The per capita basis removes the influence of population changes which occur from year to year. The use of index numbers removes the dollar measure and makes relative changes and trends easier to see and compare with each other.

The two series for steel and electricity are presented because they reflect the industrial might of a country.

To reflect how well a people are thriving, to provide some insight about local sanitation, adequacy of food supply, desire to keep alive as well as create life, statistics showing the number of infant deaths per thousand live births is presented. It is a very informative statistic.

The series concerning the number of passenger cars in use in a country is included because it is considered a very meaningful indicator of well-being and independence of the inhabitants of a country.

The observations that can be drawn based on a record of high density of passenger cars in a population seem to be without limit. First, starting with the auto itself, is the implication of a

¹This is based upon measuring the thickness of a stack of 100 one dollar bills as 0.75 inches. It follows that a stack of \$100,000 in one thousand dollar bills would also measure 0.75 inches. Ten thousand of these \$100,000 stacks would contain one billion dollars and piled one on top of the other would be 7500 inches or 623 feet high. This height is of course greater than the 555.5 foot height of the Washington Monument. (Author's computation.)

country's industrial ability to produce and distribute to a great number of individuals a large quantity of automobiles. On the part of the owners and users of the autos, it seems to reveal a degree of affluence and an environment of independence and freedom in which individuals own and use the autos to go wherever they please, whenever they please. For Americans especially, the significance of the private automobile is very great. Winning may well just mean the right to be independent and free as symbolized by the prevalence of private automobiles, or reminiscent of former years the right to own a horse and roam at will. Both reveal the ability and liberty to go freely beyond satisfying the bare necessities of food, shelter, and clothing required to sustain life.

The concluding chapter addresses the question, what did it mean to the winners to win in World War II? For the victors it seemed to mean the availability of opportunities and options for action not available to the vanquished. For the vanquished, the options were limited to those permitted by the victor as well as by the capability of the surviving people to make the most of the success of survival. For the victorious United States it seemed to mean more than a victory medal and practically limitless opportunities. The United States assumed responsibilities along with the victory.

CHAPTER 2

THE MAJOR POWERS OF WORLD WAR II

The introduction suggests that there would be merit in taking a look at several of the major protagonists of World War II (WW II) with the question in mind, what did it mean for victorious powers to win? The selected countries are China, France, Germany, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (US). This chapter presents a few short background remarks concerning each of these countries, something about their territories, populations, peak strengths under arms, battle death losses, and other observations as appropriate.¹ Data for territories and populations were obtained from United Nations Statistical Yearbooks.

CHINA

In 1945, the China of Chiang Kai-shek was a victorious power and one of the Big Five participating in the organization of the United Nations. During its war with Japan, 1937-45, China's mobilized armed forces reached a peak strength of five million and suffered about 2.2 million battle deaths.²

¹The percentage relationships between peak armed forces strengths and battle deaths to populations are shown in tabular form in Annex A.

²John R. Elting, "World War II, Costs Casualties, and Other Data," Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 29, p. 530.

The victorious Nationalist Government of China under Chiang Kai-shek asserted jurisdiction over some ten million square kilometers of land and approximately 450 million people. However, Chiang's opposition, Mao Tse-tung, was already battling for control of China and was soon to force the Nationalist Government of China to leave the mainland. In October 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the existence of the Communist People's Republic of China and assumed de facto control over the mainland. The mainland contained almost all of the former territory and population of China. Chiang and the Nationalist Government of China withdrew to the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Both governments, the People's Republic of China and the Nationalist Government of China claim to be the legal government of China. However, the Nationalist Government actively supported by the United States, continues as the legal representative of China in the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the People's Republic of China established a closed Communist society on the mainland demanding continuous sacrifices from its people while struggling to establish an industrial, self-reliant nation. Internationally, the People's Republic of China challenges the USSR for leadership of the Communist world, and with great outspoken vigor opposes the "imperialist" United States.

Thus there are in fact two Chinas. The chance of reestablishing a unified China under Chiang appears to be very remote--if the chance exists at all.

FRANCE

France, a victorious Allied power and one of the Big Five of the United Nations, was occupied by the German Army for four years during WW II. It wasn't until the Allied victories in 1944 that a French government-in-exile established by General Charles de Gaulle in London was able to reestablish itself in France

During WW II, the French armed forces reached a peak strength of about five million and sustained about 210 thousand battle deaths.³ Although there was no change in French territory, French population decreased from 41.9 million in 1937 to about 40.6 million in 1946. The havoc and destruction of war behind them, the population didn't explode as elsewhere in the world. However, it did recover and increase to 42.8 million as revealed by the French census taken in May 1954.⁴

GERMANY

When Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies on 8 May 1945, Germany ceased to exist as a State and the objectives of the German Third Reich sought by aggression and conquest were not to be achieved. To help accomplish those unattained goals, Germany, including Austria, had raised an armed force which reached a peak strength of 10.2 million from a population of about 74 million and lost 3.5 million in battle deaths.⁵ The government of

³Ibid.

⁴United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1955, p. 32.

⁵Elting, op. cit.

the German people became a responsibility of the victorious allies and on 5 June 1945, the US, UK, France, and USSR assumed supreme authority over Germany.⁶ Although the leaders of the US, UK, and USSR had agreed at their meeting in Potsdam, 17 July - 2 August 1945,⁷ to treat Germany during the period of occupation as a single economic unit subsequent events and dissension among the allies finally resulted in the partition of Germany. That part of pre-World War II German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers and the port of Stettin (now Szczecin) on the west bank of the Oder was given to Poland to administer. For all practical purposes Poland has annexed this area. It is estimated that about six million refugees moved out, a majority of them settling in what was to become West Germany.⁸ Thus about 23% of prewar Germany disappeared behind Polish borders.

The remainder of Germany, except for minor border adjustments with the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, was divided into four geographic zones to be occupied by US, UK, France, and USSR. Berlin which was to lie completely in the USSR zone was also divided into four zones to be occupied by the four Allies. This division was to be temporary until a peace treaty was signed between the Allies and Germany.

⁶US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-49, p. 506.

⁷Ibid., p. 38.

⁸Norman J. G. Pounds and Robert C. Kingsbury, An Atlas of European Affairs, p. 72.

In 1948, after continuing dissension among the WW II Allies, and unsuccessful attempts to unify all four zones, the US, UK, and France merged their zones for economic purposes. The Saar was not included. It became an autonomous territory economically attached to France. On 21 September 1949, the merged zone became the Federal Republic of Germany. In the following month, October 1949, the USSR zone of Germany became the German Democratic Republic. One of the first acts of the German Democratic Republic was to accept the loss of the former German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers to Poland as permanent. The two German states have remained divided and based on their alliances are commonly referred to as West Germany and East Germany.

It might be noted here that East Germany emphasized its separation when it announced in May 1952, the creation of a police-guarded three-mile wide no man's land all along its western border firmly isolating itself from the West.⁹ Nevertheless, many Germans somehow overcame the obstacles and escaped from East Germany. Population estimates for East Germany show a decrease from 19.7 million in 1946¹⁰ to 16.0 million in 1962.¹¹ During the same period, West Germany's population increased from 47.7 million¹² to 54.8 million.¹³

⁹"Germany," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10, p. 293.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 294.

¹¹United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963, p. 36.

¹²"Germany," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10, p. 294.

¹³United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963, p. 36.

Prewar Germany had an area of 469 thousand square kilometers. After a loss of 115 thousand square kilometers, primarily in the territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers lost to Poland, the remaining 354 thousand square kilometers were divided into two German states, East and West. East Germany has a territory of 108 thousand square kilometers and West Germany has 246 thousand square kilometers.¹⁴

JAPAN

Japan was a feudal country when in 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, USN, succeeded in opening its ports to US ships needing supplies. In 1859, Japan signed a commercial trade agreement with the US and opened up six Japanese ports to foreign residents.¹⁵ Seclusion of Japan under feudal Tokugawa government was coming to an end. Japanese leaders observed the strength of the western countries and were eager for Japan likewise to be strong. In 1868, fighting among the feudal leaders in Japan stopped with restoration of imperial rule. Emperor Meiji in his charter oath of 1868 committed his government to seek inter alia knowledge and wisdom throughout the world and abandon customs of the past. Japan was out to achieve military and materiel equality with the western powers which had opened up Japanese ports to the world. Japan rapidly moved out of feudalism to become one of the major industrial countries of the twentieth century.

¹⁴"Germany," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10, p. 294.

¹⁵"Japan," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 12, p. 923.

In 1894-95, Japan waged a successful war with China and acquired the islands of Formosa and Pescadores and a part of Manchuria. Japan also obtained commercial trade rights in China thus assuming a measure of status with the US and European countries which had similar trade rights. In a war with Russia, 1904-05, Japan was successful and took over the Russian economic and political interests in south Manchuria and acquired the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and in 1931 occupied Manchuria. Japan had quickly become a military and imperial power in the Far East.¹⁶

All this progress was risked, undoubtedly without full realization of possible consequences, on 7 December 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. A little less than four years later, having suffered considerable destruction in its home islands, Japan capitulated and on 2 September 1945 surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The armed forces of Japan had reached a peak strength of 6.1 million and suffered battle deaths of 1.2 million.¹⁷

For Japan, whose sole condition for surrender was a qualification concerning a retention of the imperial institution, surrendering unconditionally really meant to stop losing. The victorious allies cut Japan back to its home islands where in 1946, it had a population of 75 million. After that, the substance of the Allied demands was for a Japan no longer a menace to the US or to the

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 926-927.

¹⁷Elting, op. cit.

peace of the world, a Japan whose people had freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, and fundamental human rights. Under the strong leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, USA, the reconstruction of Japan and the democratizing of the Japanese got underway.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

In 1939, the USSR covered a vast area of 21.6 million square kilometers and had a population of 170.5 million people.¹⁸ To prosecute the war, the USSR raised an Armed Force which reached a peak strength of 12.5 million. It has been estimated that 7.5 million died in battle.¹⁹

During, and immediately following WW II, the USSR annexed the eastern third of prewar Poland up to the Curzon Line,²⁰ some territory ceded to it by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Roumania, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, part of East Prussia from Germany, Karafuto and Kurile Islands from Japan, and the Tuva People's Republic for a total of 690 thousand square kilometers and a population of 22.8 million people. Thus the USSR regained practically

¹⁸United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1948, p. 29.

¹⁹Elting, op. cit.

²⁰" . . . a proposed Polish-Soviet armistice line put forth on 11 July 1920, by Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister originally the Curzon Line was not meant to be a proposed eastern frontier of Poland." Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 6, p. 899.

all the territory Russia had lost in the Far East in 1904 and in Europe in World War I.²¹

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND (UK)

After considerable amount of effort to have "Peace in our time," the UK declared war on Germany in September 1939. In the subsequent war years, the UK suffered 245 thousand battle deaths in a military force that reached a peak strength of 5.1 million men and women.²² Although not occupied or invaded by sea, as threatened, the UK was subjected to and endured massive and destructive air raids. The territory of the UK remained unchanged at 244 thousand square kilometers. Her population increased slightly from 47.3 million in 1937 to 49.2 million in 1946.²³

The UK had not joined in WW II to expand her territory. Although undoubtedly concerned about her own independence, the UK was also concerned about the independence of the smaller countries of Europe and about the preservation of individual rights and freedoms.²⁴ Triggered by the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the UK declared war on Germany. Prime Minister Winston Churchill commented that: "It was for this that we had gone to war against Germany--that Poland should be free and sovereign."²⁵

²¹Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, pp. 494-495; 503.

²²Elting, op. cit.

²³United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1948, p. 27.

²⁴Winston S. Churchill and the Editors of LIFE, The Second World War, Vol. II, p. 583.

²⁵Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 368.

Although victorious and one of the Big Five, the UK lost out with respect to Poland. The UK was successful in keeping the Third Reich from getting Poland only to lose it behind the iron curtain.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US)

Ever since the South Manchurian Railway "incident" of September 1931, and the subsequent Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the US had been trying to restore peace in the Far East, diplomatically. Diplomacy not only failed to stop the occurrence of the many "incidents" in China in which American lives and property were lost, but also failed to prevent the Japanese attack on the US itself on 7 December 1941. The ocean barriers which had supported isolationism and safety quickly disappeared. US military forces were soon actively engaged defending the Philippines and supporting China in the Far East and the Western Allies in Europe. The US military force reached a peak strength of 12.3 million from a population of approximately 132 million. The US lost 292 thousand in battle deaths.²⁶

Territorially, the victorious US remained unchanged at 9.4 million square kilometers, but the China that the US attempted to keep from falling into the hands of the Japanese fell instead into the hands of the Communists.

²⁶Elting, op. cit.

This chapter has identified the seven countries subject of this paper. Each country raised a large armed force for WW II and sustained a sizable number of battle deaths. The vanquished lost an opportunity for extraterritorial domination. In addition, Germany ceased to exist as such. Part of it became a part of Poland, the rest became East Germany and West Germany. The victors were losers in some ways too. The US was unable to prevent the takeover of most of the land and people of its ally China by the Communists. The UK was not able to assure freedom and independence for Poland. France was occupied by the enemy forces for almost four years. The USSR lost 7,500,000 in battle deaths, more than twice as many as the total for the four other Allies combined.

In the next chapter each of the countries is looked at with respect to its national productivity and the individual well-being of its people.

CHAPTER 3

POSTWAR NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING

In Chapter 2 the selected protagonists of WW II were briefly described, primarily in terms of their territories, populations, peak armed forces strength, and battle death losses. In this chapter, the portraiture is continued with statistics which relate to national productivity and individual well-being.

Two series are presented as relating directly and in tangible terms to national industrial productivity; production of crude steel and production of electrical energy. Introduced because it is fashionable to address gross national product whenever a country is being described and because on a per capita basis it serves to bridge national productivity to individual well-being is the series presenting per capita national product. The next two series are considered as very reflective not only of the health and well-being of the people as individuals, but also as indications of their affluence and freedom of movement. These two series concern infant mortality rates and diffusion of the private automobile.

The concluding section of this chapter briefly presents data concerning postwar US Foreign Aid..

NATIONAL PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL
AND ELECTRICAL ENERGY

Production of steel and electricity are very tangible evidences of industrialization and modern, twentieth century enterprises. Such production does not necessarily mean lots of automobiles and electric gadgets in twentieth century homes. The production can be diverted to satisfy purposes of the state such as fabrication of nuclear devices while the people do with less than what might otherwise be made available to them. The preceding has particular reference to Red China which has successfully detonated two nuclear devices while the Chinese go hungry. Regardless of who benefits from the production, production of crude steel and electric energy are positive indicators of industrial might.

Although the following tables invite comparison among the countries, note first how quickly the countries recovered to produce at their prewar rates and then progressed to even greater rates of production.

Table 1.

PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL
(millions of metric tons)

COUNTRY	1939	1940	-	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
China-Main	.54	.60		--	--	--	.16	.60	.90	1.35	1.77	2.23	2.85
China-Taiwan	--	--		--	--	.004	.003	.014	.016	.018	.020	.025	.040
France	7.94	4.41		4.41	5.73	7.24	9.15	8.65	9.84	10.89	10.00	10.63	12.60
Germany-East	--	--		.15	--	.31	--	1.00	1.55	1.89	2.16	2.33	2.51
Germany-West (17.90) ^{1/}	--	--		2.56	3.06	5.56	9.16	12.12	13.51	15.81	15.42	17.43	21.34
Japan	6.70	6.86		.56	.95	1.72	3.11	4.84	6.50	6.99	7.66	7.75	9.41
USSR	17.56	18.32		13.35	14.53	18.64	22.29	27.33	31.35	34.49	38.13	41.43	45.27
UK	13.43	13.18		12.90	12.93	15.12	15.80	16.55	15.89	16.68	17.90	18.82	20.11
US	47.90	60.77		60.42	77.02	80.41	70.74	87.85	95.44	84.52	101.25	80.12	106.17
World	117.40	138.9		108.9	133.2	155.8	136.40	161.30	210.8	211.4	234.7	223.4	269.2
	--Data Not Available												
	^{1/} Estimate of West Germany production for 1938												
Source: United Nations, Statistical Year Book - 1958, Table 110.													
United Nations, Statistical Year Book - 1960, Table 108.													

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Table 1 displays the production of crude steel by country in millions of metric tons (2200 pound tons) for the postwar decade, when available, early war production data for the years 1939 and 1940 are included for comparison purposes. The war over, it is not unexpected to find that crude steel production in 1946 was less than production in 1939 and 1940. At that time there was neither the war need for nor the undamaged capability which would permit the production of great quantities of steel. Production facilities had been targets and casualties of war, and the need to satisfy the insatiable demands of war had disappeared with the silencing of the guns. In addition, the victorious allies were not permitting the vanquished to produce the quantities they might have liked to produce.

Considering the losers, Japan first exceeded its early war production rate in 1952 when its postwar industry produced seven million metric tons. Data for steel production in the area that became East Germany are not available, so no comparison for that area is made. However, for West Germany available data indicates that an estimated 17.90 million metric tons were produced in that area in 1938. West Germany did not exceed this rate until 1955 when it produced 21.34 million metric tons. Both Japan and West Germany found markets for their steel in consumer goods and export. Relatively small amounts were consumed for their own armament even as the countries assumed more responsibility for their own defense.

The other countries rather quickly exceeded their prewar production rates. By 1955, the US and USSR had more than doubled their output. Together these two countries accounted for 55% of the total world production.

The next table, Table 2, shows the country by country production of electric energy in billions of kilowatt hours. As for steel, the period covered is the postwar decade. For comparison purposes 1939 is included.

It is difficult to visualize any society desiring to compete in the twentieth century which would not have to rely on the use of electrical energy. Even the guerrilla activities in the areas of the world labelled as underdeveloped are more vile to the extent that they are supported by high electric energy consuming societies.

The very temporary but complete loss of electric energy in northeast US in the Fall of 1965 brought into stark focus the extent to which modern society depends on electricity for its day to day well-being.

The data describing production of electric energy is included in the profile of the WW II countries because it shows the reestablishment of or increase in industrial might of these countries. To a limited extent such data also reflects the material well-being of the inhabitants. Here attention is invited to the fact that Red China's electricity must have been consumed by increased industrial activity as the peasants continued to live

poorly while the country moved on to produce nuclear devices.

In 1960, Red China produced 58.5 billion kilowatt hours¹ almost five times the production of 12.28 billion kilowatt hours shown for 1955 in the table below.

¹United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1963, p. 342.

Table 2.
PRODUCTION OF ELECTRIC ENERGY
(billions of kilowatt hours)

COUNTRY	1939	-	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
China-Main.	5.96 ^{1/}		--	--	--	4.31	--	5.75	7.26	9.20	11.00	12.23
China-Taiwan	.70 ^{2/}		--	--	.84	--	--	1.29	1.42	1.56	1.81	1.97
France	22.10		22.96	25.94	28.85	30.03	33.14	38.15	40.57	41.46	45.57	49.63
Germany-East	(41.38) ^{3/}		--	--	14.60	--	--	21.46	23.18	24.25	26.04	28.70
Germany-West	(41.38) ^{3/}		--	26.60	32.84	38.72	44.02	51.85	56.78	61.03	68.52	76.54
Japan	34.08		29.06	32.55	35.58	40.98	44.89	47.73	51.65	55.70	60.03	65.20
USSR	39.37 ^{2/}		--	--	66.34	--	--	104.02	119.12	134.33	150.70	170.23
UK	27.73		42.74	43.98	43.04	50.62	56.54	72.84	75.16	79.11	86.35	94.08
US	161.30		269.36	307.31	336.81	345.07	385.67	433.36	463.06	514.17	544.65	629.01
World	459		594	658	727	769	872	1071	1157	1262	1372	1545
	--Data not available.											
	^{1/} 1941.											
	^{2/} 1938.											
	^{3/} Total for prewar Germany.											
Source; United Nations. Statistical Yearbook - 1952, Table 119.												
United Nations. Statistical Yearbook - 1958, Table 122.												
23												

The above table shows that the USSR and the US increased their production of electricity by very impressive amounts, a 334% increase for USSR (1938 to 1955) and a 290% increase for the US (1939 to 1955). Not as impressive is the comparison of 1955 production of combined East and West Germany with Germany of 1939 which shows only a 72% increase. The remaining countries show production increases between these extremes.

The foregoing data on the production of steel and electricity reveal not only recovery from the destruction and havoc of WW II but also significant growth during the postwar decade. When testifying in hearings before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on 10 December 1956, Dr. Harry Schwartz, Specialist on Soviet and Satellite Affairs, The New York Times, invited the attention of the Committee to the production of coal, oil, steel, and electricity in Communist and non-Communist areas of the world to indicate and compare the economic growth of these two areas of the world.² Dr. Schwartz noted the impressive economic growth of the Communist world and suggested to the Committee that there was at least one major difference between the economic growth in the Communist world and in the non-Communist world which had to be taken into account.

The economic growth in the Communist world has been produced by the use of tremendous compulsion. The system we call Stalinism, with its related unpleasant features of secret-police control, slave-labor camps, complete repression of freedom

²US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, World Economic Growth and Competition, p. 34.

of speech, freedom of press and the like, was required because the Communist's goal of achieving maximally rapid increase of heavy industry could only be achieved at the cost of keeping down the standard of living of those people.³

PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

One currently very fashionable way of discussing the material well-being of a country is to view the total annual flow of goods and services in that country over a period of years. The value at market prices of all the final goods and services produced is identified as a country's Gross National Product (GNP). In order to relate to the individual, as well as that can be done when using averages, and reveal whether the GNP is keeping up with the increases in population, the GNP in Table 3 is shown on a per capita basis.

³Ibid., p. 37.

Table 3. Index numbers of Total and Per Capita Product at Constant Prices. 1/ (1958=100).

Country		1950	1953	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
China-Mainland	A	--	--	62	71	74	100	122	135
<u>2/</u>	B	--	--	68	76	76	100	119	130
China-Taiwan	A	--	72	84	88	94	100	107	116
<u>3/</u>	B	--	86	93	94	97	100	103	107
West France	A	71	80	87	93	97	100	103	110
<u>3/</u>	B	76	84	90	95	98	100	102	108
Germany-West	A	55	71	86	92	97	100	107	116
<u>3/</u>	B	59	75	89	94	98	100	106	114
Japan	A	--	73	83	90	97	100	117	134
<u>4/</u>	B	--	77	86	92	98	100	116	132
USSR	A	44	60	75	83	89	100	107	116
<u>2/</u>	B	50	65	79	86	90	100	106	112
UK	A	86	91	98	98	100	100	105	110
	B	88	92	99	99	101	100	104	109
US	A	72	92	98	100	102	100	107	109
<u>3/</u>	B	91	101	103	103	103	100	105	106

--Data not available

A - Total

B - Per Capita

1/ Using constant prices removes the effect of changes in price levels.

2/ Net Materiel Product (excludes value of services) at market prices.

3/ Gross Domestic Product (GNP less net foreign income) at market prices.

4/ GNP at market prices.

(Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1964, Table 174.)

The substance of the notes accompanying the above table are a reminder that the figures should be interpreted with caution, especially for intercountry comparisons. Therefore observations based upon the above table are limited and cautiously presented. Note that the period covered is 1950-1960 instead of 1945-1955. Reliable and relatable data for the entire earlier decade appears to be unavailable.

All of the countries display a growth pattern for the ten year period shown in Table 3 with China-Mainland, West Germany, Japan, and USSR significantly greater than the others. The rapid growth of these latter countries might find explanation in a study prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe.⁴ This study suggests that for a variety of reasons economic expansion in any one country may be faster in some periods than in others. For example, a period of rapid growth might well follow a period of slow growth during which opportunities for technical progress accumulate and capacity is under-utilized as is indicated by the data for West Germany. The rate of change of Gross Domestic Product for West Germany for 1939-1949 was 2.2 compared with 7.4 for 1949 to 1959. Similar statistics for US are 4.4 for 1939-1949 and 3.3 for 1949-1959.⁵

For China-Mainland the above table shows an appreciable improvement in the short span from 1955 to 1960. This was the period in which collectivization of agriculture was virtually completed (1958)

⁴United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Some Factors in Economic Growth in Europe During the 1950's.

⁵United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, op. cit., Chapter II, p. 3.

and significant industrial progress was accomplished with considerable technological assistance from USSR. Although the validity of data from the Chinese mainland is frequently questioned, there is evidence of industrial progress as indicated by the successful detonation of two nuclear devices in October 1964 and May 1965. Unfortunately for the Chinese people, 1960 was the year in which USSR withdrew her sizeable amount of technical aid assistance. Unfortunately this adversity was followed by three years of serious natural calamities which resulted in decreased agriculture output. The Chinese hoped for "Great Leap Forward" failed and in 1961 China-Mainland found it necessary to abandon long-term planning in order to concentrate on the task of overcoming the loss of Russian technical assistance and decreased agricultural output.

INFANT MORTALITY

In searching population data for a statistic which might convey some meaning, easily visualized, about how well a people are thriving, the series for infant deaths under one year of age per thousand live births was considered most promising. Life expectancy data also appeared promising but were considered not to be as quickly responsive to improving conditions as would be infant mortality data. It is relatively easy to visualize the close connection between decreasing infant mortality statistics and local improvements in sanitation, amount of food available, elimination of poverty, and modernization. The resulting picture reveals

an environment in which it is easier to keep infants alive and in which the inhabitants are encouraged and are willing to do so. The following table contains infant mortality data for China-Taiwan, France, West Germany, Japan, UK, and US. Similar data for the same period is not available for China-Mainland and USSR.

Table 4. Infant Mortality Rates. (Deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births. Data excludes fetal deaths.)

Year	China Taiwan	France	West Germany	Japan	UK	US
1935-39	144.4	71.1	59.2*	110.4	58.5	53.2
1940	135.5	90.5	64.1	90.4	61.0	47.0
1941	122.9	72.7	--	84.4	63.3	45.3
1942	126.1	71.0	--	85.8	52.9	40.4
1943	125.2	75.4	--	87.0	51.9	40.4
1944	--	77.7	--	--	47.6	39.8
1945	--	108.2	--	--	48.8	38.3
1946	--	67.2	90.2	--	42.7	33.8
1947	--	66.0	83.8	76.7	43.5	32.0
1948	56.6	55.9	68.1	61.7	36.0	32.0
1949	47.9	60.2	58.4	62.5	34.1	31.3
1950	35.3	52.0	55.5	60.1	31.4	29.2
1951	34.5	50.8	53.4	57.5	31.1	28.4
1952	35.3	45.2	48.2	49.4	28.1	28.4
1953	33.7	41.9	46.4	48.9	27.6	27.8
1954	30.1	40.7	42.9	44.6	26.3	26.6
1955	33.9	38.6	41.7	39.8	25.8	26.4

*1938

-- Data not available

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1948, Table 4,
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1953, Table 4,
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1957, Table 4.

The above table shows a constantly decreasing infant mortality rate for the US. Each of the other countries reveals an increase in infant deaths during WW II, not unexpected since the inhabitants of these countries were directly impacted by the destruction of war. However, significant and continuing improvement is shown for all the countries during the postwar period. Although similar data for the immediate postwar years is not available for USSR, data made available for 1956 and later years reveal that the USSR infant mortality rate is also relatively low. The reported rates went from 47 for 1956 to 32 in 1961.⁶ Measures for improving medical care in the USSR fourth five-year plan, which became law in 1946, made attendance at Child Health Clinics mandatory throughout all of USSR.⁷

DIFFUSION OF THE PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE

To obtain a view, perhaps a somewhat limited view, of the standard of living and freedom attained by both the victors and the vanquished of WW II, the next table shows the number of passenger cars in use in their respective countries, or as W.W. Rostow, Professor of Economic History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, refers to it--the diffusion of the private automobile.⁸

⁶Reported in United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1963, but not computed by the Statistical Office of the United Nations.

⁷"Maternal and Child Health," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, pp. 68-69.

⁸W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, a non-communist manifesto, p. 84.

Why passenger cars? Because the story of the passenger cars, or as more frequently called the automobile, or just auto, tells much about the affluence and freedom of a people as individuals and families.

Starting with the production and purchase of the auto itself there is indicated the capability, or lack of it, to mass produce and distribute among the population of a country a relatively expensive piece of machinery. On the part of the purchasers, it indicates a willingness and financial ability of a large number of people to acquire a means of relatively unrestricted mobility. Unrestricted because the country would have a road network and the inhabitants would have the liberty and time to travel. With the increased availability of the private auto and the private person's ability to purchase and operate one or more comes a mobility from which has sprung suburbia with its new home construction. With this is associated all the things needed for suburbia living and new homes such as furniture, radios and television sets, kitchen gadgets, lawn and garden equipment, and so forth. It is obvious that many aspects of a way of life may be deduced from an observation that a country has a high density of autos among its people. For that reason the statistics showing the number of autos per thousand population is added to the profile of the winners and losers of WW II.

Table 5. Private Automobiles in Use Per Thousand Population (1939, 1946-55)

Country	1939	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
France	49.0	38.3	--	36.7	36.5	--	37.9*	41.3	47.2	62.1*	69.3
West Germany	17.8	--	4.2	4.7*	7.5	10.7	14.1	18.5*	23.0	28.0*	33.1
Japan	0.83 ^{1/}	--	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.52	0.68	1.02	1.32	1.56	1.71 ^{2/}
USSR	0.50 ^{1/}	1.10 ^{1/}	--	--	--	--	1.00	--	1.20	--	1.80
UK	43.6	37.3	40.6	40.5	43.8	46.1	48.6	51.1	56.1	62.8	71.1
US	200	201	214	227	244	266	277	280	292	300	316

-- Data not available

* Change in series

France: includes commercial vans under one ton except 1951-53.

Germany: Excludes Saar and West Berlin. Other changes not explained.

^{1/} Major change in series. USSR: Guesses from 1946 on.

^{1/} Figure is for 1938.

^{2/} Figure would be about 7.3 if the over 500,000 midget cars are included.

(Source: W. W. Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 171)

It is quite obvious from the above table that the US has a tremendous number of autos compared to the other countries shown. The US has an average of over three autos per ten people. The closest competitors are the UK and France with about seven tenths of an auto per ten people. Rostow suggests that a number of technical and geographic factors bear on Europe's relatively slower shift to the road: inter alia, the vast amount of capital required for road building; monopolistic power of railways; and earlier start of the US in mass producing the auto for the mass market.⁹ Also the American worker accepted more quickly than the European worker the notion that the gadgets of the machine age, travel, and the other services which a mature economy can afford are really for him and his family. Of course, during the immediate postwar years, the problems of recovery came first and production of private automobiles could hardly have been considered essential. In 1965, the statistics revealed a rapid growth of motoring in West Europe to a ratio of about 143 autos per thousand persons, or one vehicle per seven West Europeans. Although far below the comparable US ratio of 400 per thousand or one vehicle per 2.5 persons, the rapid increase in West Europe is impressive.¹⁰ Comparable data for the USSR, East Germany, and China are not available. Pictures and news releases from behind the iron and bamboo curtains show very few autos and many bicycles.

⁹Ibid., pp. 84-85.

¹⁰J. Russell Boner, "Motoring Bonanza," The Wall Street Journal Eastern Edition, 11 Jan. 1966, p. 1.

Being a winner or loser didn't seem to influence the well-being of the Western Europeans as far as diffusion of private cars is concerned. It seems to have depended upon which side of the curtain the people were fortunate enough to live. The rapidity of national recovery and improved individual well-being was undoubtedly made possible by a factor discussed next, aid from the United States.

AID FROM THE UNITED STATES

Receiving stimuli from many sources, the US contributed handsomely to world postwar recovery. Friend, foe, neutral, all in need, had an opportunity to negotiate a Foreign Aid Agreement with the US. The US was fortunate to emerge from the war with an expanded and undamaged production base. Did winning bring with it the opportunity, if not the outright obligation to feed the live but hungry war casualties, to place allies and foes alike back on their feet? This may have been one of the suasions, but there were other stimuli.

The expanded US production base quickly converted from war production to production geared to satisfy the pent up demands of the American peacetime consumer. There remained considerable industrial production to take care of the reconstruction needs of war torn countries, but they were on the verge of economic collapse and didn't have the dollars to pay for the goods. Did winning mean that the victorious government had to find a way to keep its economy booming--even to the extent of giving the output away?

One answer was found in the European Recovery program or the Marshall Plan as it is frequently called. Secretary of State Marshall

described the proposed recovery program during an address at commencement exercises at Harvard University on 5 June 1947.¹¹ Although the plan as presented to Congress on 10 November 1947 indicated an estimated cost to the US of some 16 to 20 billion dollars,¹² it was not meant to be just charity to help feed the poor and destitute, or perhaps to be just funds with which the recipients would buy goods from the US. The purpose was "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."¹³ This may be the reason why Russia refused to participate in the program. Russia had already dropped the iron curtain in Europe. Speaking at the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946, Winston Churchill said, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent."¹⁴ Unless the US wanted this iron curtain to move further west and close off all of western Europe substituting Russia for the Third Reich, the US had to come to the aid of war torn and destitute Europe.

Does winning require staying in the game, if one may call war a game, and remaining a continuing participant in the world arena? Or, dropping out, must the winner accept the role of, if not a loser,

¹¹US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade Of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-49, pp. 1268-1270

¹²Ibid., p. 1272.

¹³Ibid., p. 1269.

¹⁴W. S. Churchill and Editors of LIFE, The Second World War, Vol. II, p. 582,

certainly not a winner? The US stayed in the arena and embarked on a massive foreign aid program. Between July 1945 and December 1955, the US made available to foreign countries in Marshall Plan and other aid programs net grants of \$46.8 billion and credits of \$10.8 billion for a total of \$57.6 billion.¹⁵ Even Russia accepted \$0.4 billion¹⁶ in US grants before she banged the iron curtain shut changing herself from a hot war ally to a cold war competitor.

If nothing else, the foregoing reveals that the US, the big winner of WW II had the economic strength, the position, and the willingness to be an influential protagonist in the postwar world scene.

WELL-BEING IN 1955

The following tabulation brings together in one table some of the facts discussed in this chapter. Under "National Well-Being" the production for 1955 is related to the production for 1939, where it is known, and shown as a percentage. The list starts with the highest percentage change and progresses to those countries attaining lesser amounts of change. The columns titled "Individual Well-Being" show the countries listed according to their respective infant mortality rates and automobiles per thousand people rates. Note that all four countries in first and second places in the two individual well-being columns are Western countries while three of the four countries leading the national well-being columns are Eastern. This indicates where the countries of the East and West place their respective priorities.

¹⁵US Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1957, p. 879.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 881.

Table 6 . Well-being in 1955

		NATIONAL WELL-BEING				INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING					
		Crude Steel		Electricity		Infant Mortal-		Automobiles			
		1955		1955		ity Rate/1000		per 1000			
		1939		1939							
		%	Country	%	Country		Country		Country		
1											1
2	First	510	China-Ma.	433	USSR	25.8	UK	316	US		2
3											3
4	Second	258	USSR	391	US	26.4	US	71	UK		4
5											5
6	Third	222	US	340	UK	33.9	China-Tai	69	France		6
7											7
8	Fourth	159	France	281 ^{1/}	China-Tai	38.6	France	33	GermanyW		8
9											9
10	Fifth	149	UK	225	France	39.8	Japan	7	Japan		10
11											11
12	Sixth	140	Japan	204 ^{2/}	China-Mai	41.7	GermanyW	2	USSR		12
13											13
14	Seventh	119	GermanyW	194	Japan						14
15											15
16											16
17	Data	China-Tai. 1939		GermanyE. 1939		China-Main.		China-Main.			17
18	Not	GermanyE. 1939		GermanyW. 1939		Germany-E		China-Tai.			18
19	-Available					3/	USSR		GermanyEast		19
20											20
21		1/	1955:1938 instead of 1955:1939								21
22		2/	1955:1941 instead of 1955:1939								22
23		3/	Germany-West produced in 1955 25% more than								23
24			all of prewar Germany in 1939.								24
25											25
26		Source: Consolidation of preceding Tables 1, 2, 4, & 5.									26
27											27
28											28
29											29
30											30
31											31
32											32
33											33
34											34
35											35

An inference may be drawn that winning presented the victors with an opportunity to direct the allocation of their individual resources and efforts where their respective ideologies focused their attention.

The next and concluding chapter reflects on what did it mean to win in WW II.

CHAPTER 4

WHAT DID IT MEAN TO WIN?

The preceding chapters reveal for the countries concerned not only recovery after the devastation of World War II (WW II), but also accomplishments in the direction of even more material well-being for their people as individuals. The major exceptions are the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). A third and apparently quite unwilling exception is the divided portion of Germany behind the iron curtain, East Germany.

These countries have not made as much data available as the others. However, there is enough information available to reveal definite increased national productive capability for the USSR, the PRC, and East Germany, but indications are that their peoples have not progressed very far, if at all, in terms of material well-being. No attempt has been made to measure their ideological or spiritual well-being as they slave to help their leaders bring forth into reality their world socialist revolution.

THE VANQUISHED

What did the vanquished lose? Third Reich Germany and militarist Japan lost the opportunities to expand their influence over the territories and peoples included in their aggressive goals.

Had Japan been a victor the course leading to recovery would undoubtedly have been different than the one followed. As a victor, Japan would have created opportunities in her own desired

image. The options for action would have belonged to Japan. However, as a loser the options were limited to those made available by the victor. Japan was required to withdraw from China and other occupied territories back to her home islands and modified her government hierarchy so as to exclude and preclude military exploitation from future ambitions. With General MacArthur as leader of an undivided occupation of Japan and the US as a benefactor, Japan proceeded directly on a course leading to recovery and independence albeit US influenced and territorially limited to her home islands.

Vis-a-vis Japan, Germany fared significantly less well. Germany ceased to exist as Germany.

Germany gave up some 23% of her prewar territory to Poland. The remainder of Germany became two Germanies, East and West, where twenty-one years later, by treaty and occupation, the victors continue to maintain armed forces. Except for Berlin, these are not occupation forces, at least not so in West Germany. In West Germany they are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces participating in the defense of West Europe against potential aggression by the USSR, a WW II ally of the US and the UK. West Germany, by virtue of its importance to the defense of Western Europe has had many opportunities to improve its material well-being along with its former enemies of WW II. East Germany became a closed society, curtailed off by the USSR from West Germany as well as the rest of the Western countries. For the East Germans, having lost WW II must mean something beyond the lost opportunity

for territorial expansion, domination and influence. To the extent that the younger East Germans are aware of what goes on beyond the borders, they must feel that indeed they are being called upon to pay for the sins of their fathers. Having lost is turning out to be a significant continuing detriment for the Germans in East Germany.

THE VICTORS

What do the winners look like in the postwar period? China, one of the Big Five and a member of the United Nations soon became de facto two Chinas, a Nationalist China and a People's Republic of China. The Nationalist China of Chiang and WW II, by 1949, lost control of the mainland to communist competitor Mao and withdrew to the island of Formosa (Taiwan). China of the mainland became a Communist closed society proclaimed in October 1949, as the People's Republic of China (PRC), an announced militant competitor of the West and an active competitor of USSR within the East. Although the evidence indicates little or no improvement in the material well-being of the individual mainland Chinese, the PRC became a nuclear "have" country, sufficiently productive and militant to be an influential irritant in the world arena. The victorious WW II government of China still under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and still sponsored by the US, sits, twenty-one years later, confined to the island of Formosa.

Although the postwar direction taken by the vast majority of WW II China is alien to Western ideologies, China, as a victor, nevertheless had the option of selecting which opportunity was to be exploited. China chose Communism.

Over in Europe, France was devastated in WW II, during which it was a battleground and occupied by the Germans. Although the data show recovery both for the nation and the material well-being of the people, the sting of initial defeat and German occupation appears to have remained to spur France to become a nuclear "have" nation and to be independent of, and if necessary, different from her two benefactors, the US and the UK.

The German invasion of Poland in September 1939, triggered the UK declaration of war to recover for Poland her independence and freedom. The UK was victorious and in the postwar years recovered from devastation of German aerial attacks and partially recovered from a spent treasury. However, having succeeded in relieving Poland of German occupation, the UK lost Poland to the USSR, a condition not considered free and independent, certainly not by Western standards. What did the UK win? Poland was gone as a buffer between East and West. The USSR domination over East Germany placed Russia right in the middle of Europe.

What did it mean to win for the USSR? Except for Finland and Poland, the USSR regained practically all the territory lost in the Far East in 1904 and in Europe in WW I. The USSR continued to be pretty much the closed society that Neil S. Brown, US Minister to Russia, described in 1853.

This is a hard climate, and an American finds many things to try his patience, and but few that are capable of winning his affections. One of the most disagreeable features that he has to encounter, is the secrecy with which everything is done. He can rarely obtain accurate information, until events have transpired, and he may rely upon it, that his

own movements are closely observed by eyes that he never sees. The Russian mind seems naturally distrustful, and this is especially so with the government officials. . . .

Nothing is made public that is worth knowing. You will find no two individuals agreeing in the strength of the Army and Navy, in the amount of the public debt, of the annual revenue. In my opinion it is not intended that these things should be known.¹

However, there is much concrete evidence of a highly industrialized nation, even if the individual Russians are not included as beneficiaries as is customary in the West. Witness the demonstrated capabilities of the USSR as a nuclear "have" country and as a participant in space exploration beating the US into space. Politically, the international influence of the Communist Party with its satellites in non-East countries and conversions of massive China and tiny Cuba must be considered part of the "win." Having successfully joined the winning side in WW II before it was too late and by taking uninhibited advantages of the political opportunities available to the victors, the USSR attained for itself a dominant position in the world, politically, militarily and economically. The fact that individual Russians may not enjoy the same degree of material well-being as the West detracts little, if any, from the USSR influence in the world.

After several years of appeasement to obtain "Peace in our time" the UK took a stand with respect to Poland. Churchill wrote that:

It was for this that we had gone to war against Germany--that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone knew what a terrible risk we had taken

¹Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, p. 492.

when we had gone to war in 1939 although so ill armed. It had nearly cost us our life, not only as an Empire but as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest of any kind in Poland. Honour was the sole reason why we had drawn the sword to help Poland against Hitler's brutal onslaught, and we could never accept any settlement which did not leave her free, independent, and and sovereign.²

Germany surrendered and the UK was victorious. But, what did the UK win? In spite of UK efforts, Poland was quickly curtailed red, hardly "free, independent, and sovereign" in Western and UK terms of reference.

The UK had been at war for six years, had suffered her share of military casualties on the fighting fronts and civilian casualties at home. The UK undertook the problems of recovery with austerity at home and financial help from the US, lend lease continued through 1946 and in 1947 followed by Marshall Plan aid. Abroad the UK started to withdraw from and cut down her involvement in areas outside Europe. The UK withdrew from India and Pakistan in 1947, from Ceylon in 1948. The UK evacuated Palestine in 1948 and turned the Palestine problem over to the UN. Although affected by the loss of closed markets with her former colonies, the UK economy nevertheless grew steadily.

The relatively active but detached participation by the US via funds and materiel in the early years of WW II ceased to be detached when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The US

²Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 368.

declared war. Four years later the war was over and the US was victorious.

On 2 September 1945, Japan signed the surrender documents on the deck of the US battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The formalities closed, General MacArthur addressed a broadcast to the people of the United States saying, in part:

Today the guns are silent. A great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won. . . .

A new era is upon us. . . . Victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security, and the survival of civilization.

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. . . . Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving only the path to be by way of the crucible of war. . . .

The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence. . . .³

Although over three million of the US military left the Pacific Ocean areas for home between September 1945, and March 1946, the situation was not quite as irresponsible as General Wedemeyer put it, "America fought the war like a football game, after which the winner leaves the field and celebrates."⁴ The US did not leave the scene in the East or the West.

³S. E. Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, p. 1045.

⁴Morison, op. cit., p. 1061.

In the East and West and all about the world, the US remained an active participant in world affairs. Fortunate enough to be wealthy and victorious, the US shared the benefits of her expanded and undamaged production base with the rest of the world. The material well-being of the US and its people continued to expand without apparent limit. Concurrently, the US made available to other countries food, medicine, industrial goods, technician help and outright grants of funds to assist in recovery from WW II, to assist in common defense, and to assist in country development. During the first ten years after WW II, through December 1955, the US made available as part of her Foreign Aid program a total of \$57.6 billion.⁵ The US played a significant role in the reestablishment of Western Europe.

Unfortunately, in the East, US Foreign Aid did not prevent Chiang from losing control of China to Communism. Chiang and the Nationalist Government of China had to leave the mainland. However, with the continued support of the US, Chiang and the remnants of the Nationalist Government of China established themselves on the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where they have remained. Meanwhile, mainland China became a nuclear "have" country while its people remained poor and hungry. As a Communist country, it competes with Russia for Communist leadership of the world and is a bitter enemy of the US.

Nor did the US leave the scene in Japan. President Harry S. Truman appointed General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers

⁵ US Dept of Commerce, op. cit., p. 879.

(SCAP). Russia's influence on the occupation of Japan had to come through her representative on an international Pacific Commission in Washington, D. C. The SCAP was authorized to make the decisions whenever there was disagreement among the members of the Pacific Commission. General MacArthur made the decisions and the problems that became characteristic of the occupation of Germany were avoided. Emperor Hirohito was kept in power and his government faithfully carried out the orders of SCAP.

For General MacArthur, winning did not mean leaving the field to go celebrate. Nor did the US close shop and go home. The US poured food, clothing, medicaments, and other supplies into Japan. The SCAP eliminated the militarists from the government, eliminated the secret police, abolished secret societies, and brought about comprehensive land reform in which over 4.5 million acres were distributed to the peasants. S. E. Morison, American historian and Pulitzer Prize winner, considers that MacArthur's conduct of the occupation of Japan constitutes his greatest claim to fame. Apparently MacArthur also felt that he had been successful as the SCAP. For after it was over, General MacArthur wrote:

If the historian of the future should deem my service worthy of some slight reference, it would be my hope that he mention me not as a commander engaged in campaigns and battles, even though victorious to American arms, but rather as that one whose sacred duty it became, once the guns were silenced, to carry to the land of our vanquished foe the solace and faith of Christian morals.⁶

Is here the essence of winning?

⁶Morison, op. cit., p. 1062.

CONCLUSION

This review of the protagonists of WW II in the postwar period discloses no universally applicable criteria for use in defining "win." There seems to be a thread of continuity, however, that for the United States of America there is a criteria. That one is to silence the guns of war and bring about a cessation of hostilities with enough surviving resourcefulness to be a meaningful and influential presence in the postwar period, capable of making the most of all promising opportunities. For Americans this seems to especially include the opportunity ". . . to carry to the land of (the) vanquished foe the solace and faith of Christian morals."⁷


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Col Signal Corps

⁷Ibid.

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ANNEX A
WORLD WAR II

POPULATIONS AND ARMED FORCES

	Population (millions)	Armed Forces			
		Peak Strength (million)	%*	Battle Deaths (million)	%*
1					
2	China	450	5.0	1.1	2.2
3					
4	France	42	5.0	12.0	0.21
5					
6	Germany	74	10.2	13.8	3.5
7					
8	Japan	72	6.1	8.5	1.2
9					
10	U S S R	170	12.5	7.4	7.5
11					
12	U K	47	5.1	10.9	0.25
13					
14	U S	132	12.3	9.3	0.29
15					
16	*PERCENT OF POPULATION				
17	Sources: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1948, Table I				
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